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This paper investigates the dynamics between key regulatory and supervisory policies and various 
aspects of commercial bank efficiency and performance for a sample of 22 EU countries over 2000-
2008. In the first stage of the analysis we measure efficiency by employing the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) technique. In addition, we employ two distinct accounting ratios to capture the costs 
of intermediation (net interest margin) and cost effectiveness (cost-to-income ratio). Our regression 
framework includes truncated regressions and generalized linear models. Moreover, we carry out a 
sensitivity analysis for robustness using a fractional logit estimator. Our results show that 
strengthening capital restrictions and official supervisory powers can improve the efficient 
operations of banks. Evidence also indicates that interventionist supervisory and regulatory policies 
such as private sector monitoring and restricting bank activities can result in higher bank inefficiency 
levels. Finally, the evidence produced suggests that the beneficial effects of capital restrictions and 
official supervisory powers (interventionist supervisory and regulatory policies) on bank efficiency 
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Banking is one of the most regulated industries in the world.
1
 The deregulation process in the 
European Union (EU) during the 1990s has considerably liberalized banks’ structural and conduct 
rules.
 
This has been accompanied by a parallel increase in prudential regulation, particularly in 
relation to a minimum capital adequacy. Yet, financial regulation emerges as a highly controversial 
issue.  
A number of studies, prior to the recent crisis, have emphasized the role of capital standards 
in preventing bank failure and in safeguarding customers and the whole economy from negative 
externalities (e.g. Hovakimian and Kane, 2000; Gorton and Winton, 1995; Rochet, 1992). On the 
other hand, regulation may interfere with the efficient operation of banks. In this respect, whenever 
regulation is implemented with the aim of restricting or limiting banks’ activities, their conduct of 
business and the efficiency with which they operate are affected. This is because banks may react to 
a higher regulatory burden by engaging in riskier activities and invest in ways that circumvent 
regulation. This could ultimately affect economic performance (e.g. Jalilian et al., 2007). 
While regulation can take the form of detailed and precise prescriptive rules, it is often 
inaccurate. Capital adequacy rules for example, may specify how much capital each bank should 
hold, but if such rules do not truly reflect the risks involved they could unintentionally induce banks 
to hold either too much or not enough capital. Insufficient capital increases the danger of bank failure 
whilst excessive capital imposes unnecessary costs on banks and their customers with adverse 
implications for the efficiency of the banking system. Furthermore, economic theory provides 
conflicting predictions about the impact of regulatory and supervisory policies on bank performance 
(e.g. Barth et al., 2004; 2007; 2010).  
The existing evidence on the relationship between different types of regulations, supervisory 
practices, and bank performance is rather limited and most of it focuses on the experience of 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Santos (2001). Bank regulation typically refers to the rules that govern the behavior of banks, whereas 
supervision is the oversight that takes place to ensure that banks comply with those rules. It is common to distinguish 
between systemic, prudential and conduct of business regulations (Goodhart et al. 1998; Llewellyn, 1999). 
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individual countries (e.g., Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006; Berger et al., 2008). Furthermore, it 
typically relies on standard accounting measures of bank efficiency and performance (Barth et al., 
2003a,b; and Demirguc-Kunt, et al., 2004). Barth et al. (2006), for example, investigate the impact of 
a broad range of regulatory and supervisory practices on bank development, performance, and 
stability as well as on the degree of corruption in bank lending. They provide a detailed account of 
such practices for over 150 countries, and focus on capital regulations, official supervision, and 
market discipline. A recent spate of studies rely on alternative frontier methods in considering the 
relationship between regulation and bank efficiency (e.g. Fries and Taci, 2005; Grigorian and 
Manole, 2006; Pasiouras et al., 2009).  
Nonetheless, the existing empirical evidence is inconclusive and scant, especially considering 
the timeliness of the issue and the significant increase in the demand for regulation produced by the 
recent financial turmoil and bank insolvencies. In the EU, which is the focus of this paper, the Basel 
II Accord was implemented at the beginning of the crisis in 2007, and it was based on the pillars of 
minimum capital requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline. Indeed since then the 
Basel Committee responded by taking measures to strengthen the Basel II framework and approved 
for consultation a package of proposals to strengthen global capital and liquidity regulations with the 
goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector.
2
  
This paper provides an investigation of the impact of regulatory and supervisory approaches 
on bank efficiency in the EU during the period 2000-08. In addition to the traditional approach of 
relying on accounting ratios we use the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique 
to capture information about banks’ efficiency. We employ generalized linear models and a truncated 
regression model combined with bootstrapped confidence intervals using a recently developed 
econometric framework by Simar and Wilson (2007). We also conduct a sensitivity analysis using 
Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) fractional logit estimator to cross-check our results. Our evidence 
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  See http://www.bis.org/press/p091217.htm. 
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suggests that there is a strong link between various forms of banking regulation and supervision and 
bank efficiency. The effect on bank efficiency appears to change with the type of regulation, 
indicating that strengthening official supervisory power or increasing capital requirements can have a 
discernible positive impact on bank efficiency while restrictions on bank activities and excessive 
private monitoring can adversely affect the efficient operation of banks.  
The next section provides a selective review on the relationship between regulation and bank 
performance and efficiency. Section 3 presents the methodology and the data sources. Section 4 
discusses the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
While relatively little evidence exists on the relationship between regulatory and supervisory policies 
and various aspects of bank performance and efficiency, the literature on bank regulatory practices is 
copious. Theoretical studies emphasize the relative importance of capital adequacy requirements in 
bank regulation (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993). One of the main functions of capital is the ‘risk 
sharing function’ which views capital as a buffer that allows for the orderly disposal of assets and 
shields debt holders from losses. If capital is adequate then assets will not have to be sold in ‘fire 
sale’, a situation that would affect both depositors’ losses and, as a consequence, deposit insurance. 
A second key function of bank capital is that it provides owners and managers with incentives to take 
less risk (Gale, 2010). 
 Nevertheless, analysts disagree as to whether the imposition of a minimum capital 
requirement actually reduces risk-taking incentives (Blum, 1999). Official supervision can reduce 
market failure by monitoring and disciplining banks thus weakening corruption in bank lending and 
improving the functioning of banks as intermediaries (Beck et al., 2006). Powerful supervisors, 
however, may affect negatively bank performance when their concerns for their own private welfare 
dominate over concerns for the social welfare (Becker, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). No 
 5 
consensus also exists on whether market monitoring has advantages as compared to official 
supervisions and capital requirements (Herring, 2004).  
 Barth et al. (2004) provide empirical evidence on the impact of specific regulatory and 
supervisory practices on bank development, performance and stability using survey data for a sample 
of 107 countries. The results suggest that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
capital stringency, official supervisory power, bank performance and stability. In contrast, the 
produced evidence indicates that encouraging and facilitating private monitoring can boost bank 
performance. On balance their results indicate that restrictions on bank activities not only can be 
detrimental for banking performance but also increase the probability of banking crises.  
 Similarly, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) investigate the impact of bank regulations, market 
structure, and national institutions on the cost of financial intermediation as measured by accounting 
ratios (net interest margin and overhead costs). They use the databases by Barth et al. (2001b; 2004) 
for 1400 banks operating in 72 countries over 1995-1999. The results document that tighter 
regulations on banking services and activities increase the costs of financial intermediation. In 
contrast, Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) consider the same time span for a sample of listed banks 
and provide evidence suggesting that in countries with low accounting and auditing requirements 
more power on official supervisory authorities may reduce risk-taking behavior from the 
perspectives of managers. Moreover, they indicate that higher restrictions on bank activities can 
diminish the probability of a banking crisis. Beck et al. (2006) use data on 2500 firms across 37 
countries to examine the relationship between supervisory strategies and corporate financing 
obstacles. Their results show that strengthening the power of supervisory agencies may actually 
reduce the integrity of bank lending with adverse implications on the efficiency of credit allocation. 
Thus, private monitoring may have a positive impact on the banking industry in terms of efficient 
operations and sounder banks.  
 6 
 All the studies reviewed above rely on accounting measures to infer the performance and 
efficiency of the banking sector. More recent empirical studies use frontier analysis to compute 
sophisticated measures of bank performance and then relate them to the effects of regulatory 
practices. In a cross-country analysis, Pasiouras (2008) employs Tobit regression models to assess 
the impact of several types of regulations on bank-specific DEA efficiency scores for a sample of 
715 commercial banks operating in 95 countries in 2003. The results suggest that market discipline is 
significant in facilitating bank technical efficiency. In a more recent study, Pasiouras et al. (2009) 
investigate the link between bank regulations and parametric cost and profit efficiency levels for 615 
publicly listed commercial banks operating in 74 countries over 2000-2004. Their findings 
substantiate the role of market discipline and of supervisory power in increasing both profit and cost 
efficiency, while the results on capital requirements and restrictions on bank activities are mixed.  
 Similarly, recent international empirical evidence by Barth et al. (2010) indicate that tighter 
restrictions on bank activities exert a negative impact on bank efficiency (measured using the non-
parametric frontier analysis) while greater capital restrictions are marginally and positively 
associated with bank efficiency. Barth et al. (2010) also find that, although there is no significant 
relation between official supervisory power and bank efficiency, there is a significant and positive 
relationship between the latter and supervisory authority independence. The analysis is based on an 
international sample of 4050 bank observations operating in 72 countries during 1999-2007. The 
evidence broadly supports the role of market discipline. It also shows that the impact of different 
aspects of regulations on bank performance and efficiency is mixed.  
 Overall, although several studies have measured the effect of bank regulation and supervision 
on bank efficiency, the majority of these studies tend to cover large international cross-country data 
samples, and none of them offer alternative measures of efficiency. The present study advances the 
existing literature in two ways. First, it tests three alternative measures of performance, namely 
productive (in)efficiency, costs of intermediation and cost effectiveness for 22 EU countries over the 
 7 
period 2000-08. Second, it provides a robust procedure (bootstrapping) for non-parametric estimates 
and a sensitivity analysis for robustness using a fractional logit estimator. The next section provides 
the details of the models used for the empirical analysis. 
 
3. Model specification and methodological issues  
3.1 Estimating productive efficiency: the DEA approach 
While the extant literature on bank regulation and supervision relies mostly on accounting ratios for 
measuring bank performance, recent analyses highlight the advantages of frontier efficiency 
measures as indicators of bank performance and efficiency (see for extensive reviews of the 
literature e.g. Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Berger, 2007; Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010; and Hughes 
and Mester, 2010).  
The efficiency scores used in our empirical analysis are constructed using an input-oriented 
DEA approach. DEA models can be either input- or output-oriented according to whether the focus 
is on input minimization while keeping a given output level or output maximization given levels of 
the inputs (see, for more details, Coelli et al., 2005). Following the most recent banking literature, 
we employ an input-oriented DEA since banks are typically under pressure to minimize costs, where 
outputs are normally constrained by the market demand, and therefore cannot be controlled for. 
Specifically, we use the input-oriented DEA with Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) developed by 
Banker et al. (1984), which allows for the possibility that the production technology of banks in the 
sample may exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale.
3
 
This approach to modeling financial intermediation has been widely adopted in the literature, 
based on the assumption that bank managers may have higher control over inputs (e.g. personnel 
expenses) rather than outputs (e.g. loans, etc.). More specifically, in industries where the emphasis is 
on cost-control, the choice of an input orientation is natural because the input quantities appear to be 
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 The VRS specification adds a convexity constraint to the original Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes’s (1978) model. 
 8 
the primary decision variables (Ferrier and Valdmanis, 1996).
4
 DEA employs linear programming 
and makes some fairly general assumptions about the production technology (Ray, 2004), in order to 
provide an estimate of the Farrell (1957) efficiency measure for each bank in the sample.
5
 The 
efficiency scores are estimated relative to a common best-practice frontier by pooling the data across 
units estimated separately for each year. This approach allows us to estimate efficiency differentials 
not only between commercial banks within a country but across countries as well using the same 
benchmark.  
 
3.2 Regression framework 
 
In the second stage of the analysis the aim is to uncover, by means of regression methods, the 
underlying relationship between the calculated efficiency levels, regulatory and supervisory policies 
and a variety of bank- and country- specific factors. Specifically, we estimate the following three 
models: 
 
kitikiiki YEARCBSINEFF ,3,21,          (1a) 
kitikiiki YEARCBSNIM ,3,21,          (1b) 
kitikiiki YEARCBSIC ,3,21,/          (1c) 
 
where i  refers to country i , k  indexes bank k , iS is a vector of bank regulatory and supervisory 
indicators in country i , kiB ,  is a vector of bank-specific characteristics for each bank k  in country i , 
                                                 
4
 It is necessary to point out that output- and input-orientated models will estimate exactly the same frontier and therefore 
identify the same set of efficient banks. It is only the efficiency measures associated with the inefficient banks that may 
differ between the two methods. To date, the theoretical literature is inconclusive as to the best choice among the 
alternative orientations of measurement.  
5
 For a systematic introduction to DEA methodology, see among others, Ray (2004). 
 9 
iC  is a vector of country-specific control variables in country i , tYEAR is a yearly dummy variable 
and ki,  is the error term. 
The dependent variable INEFF in equation (1a) is the managerial inefficiency measure, 
measuring how far the bank is from the estimated efficient frontier. In other words, efficiency is the 
ability of a bank to fully exploit the available production technology and relates to superior 
management or technologies. It is a relative measure that implies the best-practice banks are by 
definition 100 per cent efficient, while the others are characterized as inefficient relative to them.
6
 
We use bank inefficiency rather than efficiency as dependent variable in our model as described in 
equation (1a), to be able to provide a consistent interpretation of results, since the other two 
dependent variables (equations 1b and 1c) are costs of intermediation (proxied by net interest 
margins) and cost effectiveness (the cost-to-income ratio).  
These are two accounting ratios that proxy for the level of bank performance as in Barth et al. 
(2004; 2006). In particular, the NIM, in equation (1b) is the net interest margins over interest bearing 
assets. Similarly to Barth et al. (2006), in this paper we adopt the interpretation of NIM as a signal of 
inefficient intermediation and greater market power that allows banks to charge higher margins. In 
other words, the NIM measures the gap between what the bank pays savers and what the bank 
receives from borrowers, and thus pertains to the traditional borrowing and lending operations of the 
bank.  
The dependent variable in equation (1c) is the cost-to-income ratio, C/I, used to capture 
cross-bank differences in the efficiency with which banks are managed. High costs signal 
unwarranted managerial perquisites and market power which is inconsistent with efficient bank 
intermediation (Barth et al., 2006). Cost inefficiencies and market power may be reflected in high 
costs. Therefore, the results from considering all three performance measures can be used for 
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 Specifically, kiki EFFINEFF ,, 100 , that is, if a bank presents an inefficiency score of 0.15, it means that it 




comparing different concepts of bank efficiency and to assess how productive efficiency estimates 
relate to standard financial ratios of efficiency/performance.  
 We use the regulatory and supervision variables of Barth et al. (2001b; 2006; 2008); the bank-
specific variables are drawn from BankScope and the country-specific controls are from the 
alternative World Bank. Further details regarding the sources of data and variables can are provided 
in Section 3.3. 
      The vector Si contains the regulatory and supervision explanatory variables as follows: 
 
),,,( iiiii PRMONITACTRSSPOWERCAPRQS        (2) 
  
where CAPRQ, is an index of capital requirements accounting for both overall and initial capital 
stringency. This index is calculated on the basis of nine questions with higher values indicating 
greater capital stringency. The Official Supervisory Power variable, SPOWER, measures the ability 
of supervisory authorities to take specific action in banking decisions to prevent and correct 
problems. It is calculated by adding 1 for each ‘yes’ and 0 for each ‘no’ to questions relating to 
supervisory power, with higher values indicating greater power of supervisory authorities for 
involvement in banking decisions.  
ACTRS, measures the degree to which banks may engage in real estate investments, 
insurance underwriting and selling, brokering and dealing in securities and all aspects of the mutual 
fund industry. This variable ranges from 0 to 4, with higher values indicating greater restrictiveness. 
Empirical evidence suggests that higher activity restrictions may result in lower efficiency levels, by 
reducing competition and limiting economies of scope (Barth et al., 2001a,b; 2003b). Thereby, a 
negative sign between efficiency and activity restrictions is expected.  
The variable PRMONIT measures the degree of information that is released to officials and 
the public, auditing related requirements and whether credit ratings are required.  This variable is 
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constructed by adding 1 for each ‘yes’ and 0 for each ‘no’ to ten questions relating to private 
monitoring, with higher values indicating more informative bank accounts. Evidence suggests that 
regulations enhancing private monitoring can significant increase bank efficiency (Pasiouras, 2008; 
Barth et al. 2006, 2004).  
 The regression specifications in equations (1a-1c) account for bank specific kiB ,  and country 
specific iC control variables with the corresponding vectors defined as follows: 
 
, , , ,( , , )i k i k i k i kB LNTA LIQ EQAS                  (3) 
( , , , , , )i i i i i i i i iC Z SCORE HERF GDP VOICE CORR GOVERN FINDEV FOREIGN      (4) 
  
 The vector, Bi,k, (equation 3) includes three key bank-specific variables: size, measured as the 
natural logarithm of banks’ total assets (LNTA); liquidity, that is captured by a crude ratio between 
total loans and total deposits (LIQ); and finally capitalization, proxied by the equity to assets ratio 
(EQAS). The vector of control variables in equation (4), Ci contains measures of risk, market and 
economic conditions, and institutional environment. The probability of risk of insolvency is proxied 
by the Z-score
7, which measures how many standard deviations’ profits must fall below its mean to 
bankruptcy. Higher values of the Z-score are associated with lower probabilities of failure. Thus, the 
more volatile the asset returns, the lower the Z-score. Empirical studies tend to find a significant 
relationship between banks’ risk taking incentives and performance (e.g. Konishi and Yasuda, 2004; 
Stiroh, 2004). 
                                                 
7
 We construct this indicator per country and time by aggregating the banks’ balance sheet data and define Z-score as 
(ROAA + equity/assets)/sd(ROA). The standard deviation (volatility) of ROA, sd(ROA), is estimated as a 5-year moving 
average. This variable is taken from Fitch’s BankScope database (financial structure 2008, v4 – World Bank) and is on a 
country specific basic. See Lown et al. (2000) for details. 
 12 
 To account for market condition we use a structural indicator, the Herfindahl index, which is 
measured as the sum of squared market shares (in terms of total assets) of each bank in the sample.
8
 
Since the macroeconomic environment is also likely to impact on banks’ efficiency levels, we also 
include the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita (GDPGR). A high level of GDPGR 
captures the cyclical conditions of the macroeconomic environment. It is also expected to capture the 
implications for bank efficiency stemming from operating in different economic environment, as 
demand for financial products depends on the level of economic activity. 
The vector of institutional control variables in the efficiency equation includes the following 
variables: voice and accountability (VOICE); control of corruption (CORR); government-owned 
banks (GOVERN) financial development (FINDEV) and foreign-owned banks (FOREIGN). Voice 
and accountability is an indicator of the degree to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free 
media. This variable is drawn from Kaufman et al. (2009) dataset on institutional development. 
Control of corruption measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gains, with 
larger values indicating better control of corruption by government officials. This variable is also 
derived from Kaufman et al. (2009). The government-owned banks variable is used as proxy for the 
degree of state-owned banks. It is calculated as the fraction of the banking system’s assets that is 
held by banks that are more that 50 percent owned by the government.  
Financial development is measured by the claims on domestic real non-financial sector by 
deposit money banks as a share of GDP and attempts to capture the importance of the services 
provided by financial institutions relative to the size of the economy. It is drawn from the World 
Bank financial structure database.
9
 Foreign-owned banks are used to account for the share of the 
                                                 
8
 The Herfindahl index, however, is not a good proxy for bank competition (see OECD, 2010). In addition, the 
relationship between concentration, competition and bank efficiency is by no means straightforward (see e.g. Casu and 
Girardone, 2006; Schaeck et al., 2009).   
9
 The development of the financial systems was examined using data from Beck et al. (2009). 
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banking system’s assets that are 50 per cent or more foreign-owned (FOREIGN).10 Finally, the set of 
YEAR dummy variables in equations (1a–1c) controls inter alia for other macroeconomic, regulatory 
and technological changes. In addition, we re-estimate our models by including a CRISIS dummy 
variable to capture the effects of the global financial crisis.  
Given that the estimation of Equation (1a) involves a dependent variable that emerged from 
the DEA analysis, we use a truncated estimator with bootstrapped confidence intervals that allow for 
valid inference.
11
 Specifically, we employ the Simar and Wilson’s (2007) parametric regression 
bootstrap, which incorporates the parametric structure and distributional assumptions of Equation 
(1a). This method allows for the computation of bootstrapped confidence intervals for the parameter 
estimates
1 3ˆ  . This is achieved by using 2000 bootstrap replications. Accordingly, when NIM and 
C/I are the dependent variables, we estimate the Equations (1b and 1c) using Generalized Linear 
Models (following Barth et al., 2006). We also cross-validate our results by re-estimating Equations 
(1a-1c) using Papke and Wooldridge’s (2006) fractional logit estimator (discussed in Section 4.3).12  
 
 
3.3 Data and Input-Output Definition 
 
The dataset used for obtaining the DEA efficiency scores consists of individual bank data sourced 
from unconsolidated statements drawn from BankScope by Bureau van Dijk. We focus on 
commercial banks operating in 22 EU countries over 2000-2008, namely: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
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 The foreign ownership was examined using data drawn from the World Bank database by Barth et al (2001b; 2006; 
2008).   
11
 A variety of regression methods are employed in the literature for examining the sources of bank efficiency such as 
OLS and Tobit estimators, with the Tobit assumed to be the most appropriate due to the bounded nature of the efficiency 
score (see, for example, Coelli et al. 2005). However, recently, Simar and Wilson (2007) have demonstrated that the 
Tobit estimator is inappropriate in this framework and instead suggest the use of a truncated estimator with bootstrapped 
confidence intervals. They also provide Monte-Carlo evidence that this approach ensures consistent inference in the 
second-stage regression.  
12
 We also cross-validate our results by re-estimating the second-stage regression model specified in Equations (1a-1c) 
without Luxembourg to contrast whether or not its inclusion introduces noise on the results. Overall, the 
removal/inclusion of Luxembourg does not affect our key findings. The results without Luxemburg are not reported in 
the tables but are available upon request from the authors. 
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Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom.
13
 The data have undergone substantial editing to avoid inconsistencies, reporting errors 
and double counting of institutions. Moreover in order to obtain a relatively homogenous dataset and 
further detect and remove the potential outliers from the sample, we apply the Jackstrap 
methodology.
14
 Finally, we exclude extreme outliers, which we define as banks where the basic 
accounting variables are more than four standard deviations from the mean sample.
15
  
Implementing the aforementioned screening methods, results in an unbalanced panel of 5,227 
commercial bank observations. Table 1 presents the number of bank observations by country and 
year.
16
 No single country appears to dominate our sample. Germany is the most represented with 
approximately 18.6 per cent of banks, followed by France (about 15.6 per cent).  
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
A crucial step in evaluating relative efficiency in banking is the selection of appropriate 
inputs and outputs. Following Berger and Humphrey (2007), we adopt the ‘intermediation’ approach, 
which views banks as intermediaries that employ labor, physical capital and deposits to produce 
different types of loan accounts. Accordingly, we consider personnel expenses, total fixed assets, and 
deposits and short term funding as inputs and total loans and other earning assets as outputs. 
Capturing the non-traditional activities of banks is essential, especially when dealing with banking 
institutions in the European area characterized by a wide scope of activities. Hence, we consider the 
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 Due to unavailability of data or/and missing values for a significant number of banks we had to exclude Bulgaria, 
Finland, Greece, Ireland and Romania from our EU dataset.   
14
 See, for more details, Chortareas et al. (2011).  
15
 This leads to the exclusion of 59 bank observations. The results hold even when we include these extreme observations 
in the dataset. 
16
 On average in 2005 there were 45% foreign banks in the EU according to Barth et al. (2008) database. Unsurprisingly 
(with the exception of Luxembourg) the countries with the highest percentage are typically from the New Member States 
block that was incorporated in the EU in 2004, such as Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia (97% on average).   
 15 
fee-based financial services as a third output. The descriptive statistics for the inputs and outputs 
used in the DEA efficiency measurement are presented in Table 2. 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
 We specify three groups of explanatory variables. The first group contains bank regulatory 
and supervisory indicators, focusing on Official Supervisory Power, Capital Regulatory Index, 
Private Monitoring and Activity Restrictions. As mentioned in Section 3.2, we obtain information on 
bank regulation and supervision from the World Bank database by Barth et al. (2001b) Version I, and 
updated by Barth et al. (2006, 2008) with Versions II & III. The data source for the second group of 
variables reflecting bank-specific characteristics is BankScope by Bureau van Dijk. The third group 
of explanatory variables contains country-specific factors that are expected to influence banks’ 
efficiency. The data are from the worldwide governance indicators of the World Bank by Kaufman et 
al. (2009) and the World Bank financial structure database by Beck et al. (2009). 
 In addition to the three regulatory and supervisory datasets mentioned above, we use the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank by Kaufman et al. (2009) to control for 
institutional factors that may influence efficiency. Higher values of these indicators correspond to 
better governance, with scores ranging between -2.5 and 2.5. Table 3 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables used in the regression analysis. On average, the 
‘old’ EU15 block tends to have higher quality institutions compared to the ten New Member States 
(NMSs).   
 Given that one of our aims is to test for the effects of market discipline and private 
monitoring and that information on this specific variable is not available for all 22 countries and for 
all the years, we construct a sub-sample that comprises 16 countries.
17
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<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Productive efficiency levels 
 
We estimate the banks’ efficiency scores relative to a common best-practice frontier by pooling the 
data across countries. This approach allows for estimating efficiency differentials not only between 
banks within a country but across countries as well. Overall, the results show relatively high average 
productive inefficiency levels of about 22 per cent, which is broadly in accordance with previous 
bank efficiency studies for Europe (e.g. Goddard et al., 2001; Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002; Casu and 
Molyneux, 2003; Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010).  
 
4.2 The relationship between regulation, supervision and bank performance  
 
To consider the effects of regulatory and supervisory practices on bank performance we regress the 
productive efficiency scores, the net interest margins and the cost-to-income ratios, on a set of 
regulatory and supervisory variables, while controlling for several bank- and country-specific factors 
Following Simar and Wilson (2007), we estimate the truncated regression model given in Equation 
(1a) using maximum likelihood. The parameter estimates and their bootstrap confidence intervals 
(estimated using 2000 bootstrap replications) are presented in Table 4.
18
 The reported estimates of 
equations (1b and 1c) result from applying the generalized linear models methodology to the full 
sample of banks in a cross sectional regression over 2000-2008.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
18
 The results about the confidence intervals around each estimated parameter are available from the authors upon 
request. 
 17 
Each of Tables 4-6 reports regression results derived from the estimation of eight models. 
The first column presents the basic regression model that includes bank-specific control variables, 
economic growth, competitive market conditions, and the bank regulatory and supervisory variables 
(model 1). The next three columns include country-specific variables to control the effect of 
institutional characteristics on bank efficiency (models 2-4).
19
 Model 5 accounts for the effect of 
foreign-owned banks and model 6 corresponds to re-estimating the basic model with dummies to 
control for potential effects of the recent financial crisis and the risk of insolvency. The last two 
columns test the inclusion of the private monitoring variable (models 7 and 8). As mentioned above, 
due to the unavailability of data, we run these last two models for a sub-sample of 16 EU countries.  
 
<Insert Tables 4-6 about here> 
 
 Our results indicate that, when significant, capital requirements and more powerful 
supervisors increase bank efficiency. In particular, CAPRQ displays a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient in all regression models when NIM and C/I are the dependent variables 
(Tables 5-6). Official capital adequacy regulations appear to play a crucial role in aligning the 
incentives of bank owners with depositors and other creditors. Theoretical models, however, disagree 
over the effects of capital requirements on risk-taking incentives. As Barth et al. (2004) emphasize, it 
is extraordinarily difficult for regulators and supervisors to set capital standards that mimic those that 
would be demanded by well informed, undistorted private-market participants. Previous empirical 
evidence on capital requirements tends to find a positive relationship with bank efficiency (e.g., 
Barth et al., 2010) but in general the nature of this relationship is not straightforward. Barth et al. 
(2004) and Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) find no robust link between bank efficiency (measured by 
                                                 
19
 In order to avoid problems of multicollinearity, we use the maximum condition index (as suggested by Belsley et al., 
1980) and the variance inflation factors (VIF) as measures of collinearity to select the control variables that could 
reasonably be included in the analysis. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this additional test. The full results 
are not reported, but are available with the authors upon request. 
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NIM and Overhead Costs) and capital requirements. Pasiouras (2008) find evidence of a positive 
association between capital requirements and efficiency, but this is not always statistically 
significant. Pasiouras et al. (2009) find a positive impact of capital requirements on cost efficiency 
and a negative one on profit efficiency. Convincing arguments exist indeed, that higher capital 
requirements may result in lowering the probability of bankruptcy, improving the information 
availability, which in turn increase the efficient operation of banks (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 1999; Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). Nevertheless, other authors find that capital 
requirements increase risk-taking (e.g., Blum, 1999) and argue that stricter capital standards may 
lead banks to substitute loans with alternative forms of assets (e.g., VanHoose, 2007). 
  Similarly, the coefficient of the variable SPOWER, when significant, is negative across all 
models thus suggesting that official supervision can improve the efficiency of banks’ operations. The 
only exception is when we include the private monitoring variable (columns 7-8). This result is 
probably associated with the fact that the last model uses a subset sample of countries, excluding 
some of the largest EU banking sectors (Germany, France and Spain). The bulk of existing empirical 
evidence on the relationship between official supervision and performance provides mixed results 
(Barth et al., 2004, 2007; Pasiouras, 2008; Pasiouras et al., 2009). Indeed it represents a point of 
heated debate between the proponents of the “public interest view” and those of “private interest 
view” (e.g., see Beck et al., 2006). Governments with powerful supervisors may use this power to 
improve the corporate governance of banks and reduce corruption in bank lending which in turn 
improves the efficient operation of banks (Stigler, 1971; Beck et al., 2006). The relationship between 
bank performance and official supervision, however, turns negative when re-estimating the model for 
a different sample with less developed countries. A possible explanation could be that enhancing the 
power of supervisors in less developed financial systems may reflect excessive government 
involvement, which may result in a decrease in the integrity of bank lending with adverse 
implications on the efficiency of credit allocation (Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006).  
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Turning to the variables explaining market discipline, our results uncover a strong and 
statistically significant relationship with inefficiency. To recall, higher values for ACTRS imply 
greater restrictions on banks’ activities in each country. The results of a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with all measures of performance indicate that restricting banks from 
engaging in security activities is strongly associated with lower bank efficiency and performance. 
This result is in accordance with previous findings in the banking literature (see among others, Barth 
et al., 2004, 2006, 2010; Demirguc-Kunt et al, 2004). Specifically, the literature suggests that 
restrictions on bank activities and general impediments to bankers in their business conduct reduce 
the efficiency of bank operations without a corresponding benefit in terms of other measures of bank 
performance.    
Focusing on the variable explaining private monitoring, higher values for PRMONIT imply 
more informative and transparent banks’ balance sheets. As Tables 4-5 (models 7-8) show, an 
unambiguously positive and significant impact of PRMONIT on inefficiency exists. This is 
particularly strong when INEFF and NIM are the dependent variables. In other words, our findings 
suggest that fortifying private sector monitoring can actually impede the efficient operation of banks. 
This is in contrast with previous literature that provides evidence in favor of private monitoring 
practices (Barth et al., 2004, 2006; Pasiouras, 2008).  Although our results should be interpreted with 
caution since the data were available for a smaller sample of countries, there are several possible 
interpretations of these findings. One is that the requirements for information releases which 
facilitate the monitoring of banks have an indirect effect on bank efficiency. Moreover this effect 
depends on a number of factors, including the credibility of this information. At the same time, 
however, the banks’ effort to produce this information has clearly costs that count negatively in their 
efficiency assessment.   
Turning to the vector of bank-specific variables, bank size appears to be an important factor 
that drives the differences in efficiency across banks, which is documented by a negative and 
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statistically significant sign for the LNTA coefficient. This finding is consistent with previous studies 
on European countries (e.g. Stavarek, 2004; Altunbas et al. 2007; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007). 
The liquidity variable (LIQ) constructed as total loans over total deposits capture liquidity risk. This 
variable has a significant and positive relationship with the cost of intermediation (NIM). The INEFF 
and C/I display a negative relationship with the LIQ variable but this is statistically insignificant.  
The results for bank capitalization (EQAS) reveal a significantly negative relationship in all 
regressions and for all specifications with INEFF and C/I. This finding confirms that higher capital 
ratios are related with greater efficiency and is consistent with the argument that higher capitalization 
contributes to alleviating agency problems between managers and shareholders. Shareholders in this 
case have greater incentives to monitor management’s performance and ensure that the bank is run 
efficiently (Eisenbeis et al., 1999). On the other hand, our evidence suggests that higher capital ratios 
are also associated with greater costs in terms of cost of intermediation (NIM), a finding which is in 
line with Barth et al. (2006). Thus the efficiency benefits of higher capitalization come at a cost in 
terms of accounting ratios.   
As expected, we find that the probability of bankruptcy (Z-SCORE) is negatively associated 
with all of our performance measures, indicating that countries with more efficient banking 
institutions have relative lower insolvency risk. This result is consistent with previous empirical 
studies (e.g. Konishi and Yasuda, 2004; Stiroh, 2004).  
As far as the macro environment is concerned, we find some interesting relationships. The 
results suggest a positive and significant association of market share with inefficiency. In particular, 
the coefficient for the Herfindahl index (HERF) enters positively in all of our specifications with 
INEFF and NIM. This result is in line with previous studies that focus on structural market 
imperfections arising from imperfect competition which may cause market power and lax market 
discipline in concentrated markets (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Berger and Hannan, 1998).   
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 The annual growth of per capita GDP (GDPGR) variable enters with a positive sign in all the 
specifications with INEFF as dependent variable. This result indicates that banks in expanding 
markets may be less efficient in controlling their costs, thereby resulting in lower efficiency levels. 
On the other hand, the same banks may be able to increase their performance in terms of costs. This 
result is documented by a negative and significant coefficient of GDPGR in most of the cases with 
NIM and C/I. 
 Consideration of the institutional control variables reveals that banks operating under more 
open institutional frameworks are more likely to achieve higher efficiency levels. In particular, the 
variable VOICE, that measures the degree of freedom of expressions and free media in a country’s 
system, is negatively associated across all the regressions, with productive inefficiency, profits and 
costs, indicating that more developed and democratic systems are associated with more efficient 
banking sectors. Unsurprisingly, the variable capturing corruption in lending (CORR) is negatively 
associated with inefficiency at the 1 percent levels of significance across all regressions, indicating 
that bank managers in non-corrupt markets are able to achieve greater operational efficiency levels. 
Our results show that the GOVERN variable is associated with less inefficient banking industries. 
This is in line with previous studies (Stiglitz, 1994). As in most cases, the coefficient for FINDEV 
shows a negative and significant sign in all specifications, implying that bank managers in developed 
countries have better access to technology and can monitor and screen their costs, which in turns 
improves the efficient operation of banks (Pasiouras et al., 2009). Finally, the significance of the 
variable capturing foreign-owned banks (FOREIGN) suggests that a foreign banking presence may 









4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
 
McDonald (2009) argues that DEA efficiency is not the outcome of a truncated process but rather the 
outcome of a fractional logit process (it takes values between zero and one) and thus not a latent 
variable. This motivates us to re-estimate the regression models specified in Equations (1a,b,c) for 
robustness purposes, using the Papke and Wooldridge (1996)’s ‘fractional logit’ estimator. 
In this context the application of Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) quasi-likelihood estimation 
method allows us to cross-check our results in terms of the underlying data-generating process 
(DGP), under which the DEA efficiency estimates are generated by a truncated DGP (Simar and 
Wilson, 2007) or are simply described by a fractional logit process (McDonald, 2009). The 
sensitivity analysis is carried out on all three Equations (1a-1c) because of the same fractional nature 
of the two accounting ratios. Overall, the findings from the Papke and Wooldridge (1996) method 
(Table 7) corroborate the key results from our basic regression models (model 1 and model 8) 
reported in Tables 4-6. Specifically, we continue to find a positive and significantly high effect of 
ACTRS on banks’ inefficiency across all three models. CAPRQ remain negative and statistically 
significant, a result particularly strong when NIM and C/I are the dependent variables. Finally, the 
finding for official supervisory power across all three models remains robust, indicating that 
countries with power supervisors may use this power to improve the efficient operations of banks.  
 
5. Conclusions  
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature by empirically examining the impact of regulatory 
and supervisory policies on bank efficiency and performance. We focus on a sample of banks 
operating in 22 European countries over the period 2000-2008. We obtain efficiency scores using an 
input-oriented Data Envelopment Analysis methodology and we also consider performance measures 
calculated from traditional accounting ratios, namely net interest margin and cost-to-income. Using 
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both types of performance measures enhances the robustness of our analysis but also allows direct 
comparability of our results with those of previous studies.  
Our results suggest that the variables capturing capital requirements and supervisory power 
are positively associated with improved bank performance. Strengthening official supervisory power 
or increasing capital requirements can have a discernible positive impact on bank efficiency through 
a number of channels, including the reduction in the likelihood of financial distress, lessening agency 
problems and market power. The variables capturing regulatory restrictions on bank activities and 
private monitoring appear to be affecting adversely the efficient operation of banks.  
Considering the economic and institutional environment within which bank supervisory and 
regulatory policies impact on bank performance, we find that larger banks operating in countries 
with less concentrated and more developed systems tend to have relatively higher levels of 
efficiency. Moreover, our results are consistent with the view that the functioning of national 
political systems may affect the efficient operation of banks. Controlling for these broader, national 
characteristics, can explain cross-bank differences in terms of efficiency. Furthermore, our evidence 
shows the potential perils in terms of bank efficiency from excessive requirements for market 
monitoring in the attempt to strengthen market discipline. Yet there is no doubt that the recent global 
economic and financial crisis puts this discussion on a new basis rendering the conflicting 
approaches that either view regulation as a panacea or demonize it as too general and simplistic to be 
useful. The emerging challenge is to consider which specific aspects of regulatory and supervisory 
policies affect bank performance and how their implementation and effectiveness is related to the 
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Table 1 
Data frequency distribution by country and year 
  Austria Belgium Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia France ynamreG yregraG Italy Latvia Lithuania 
Number of bank             
observations by year             
2000 33 22 6 9 46 4 111 123 10 33 15 8 
2001 33 13 5 12 43 5 109 106 9 32 14 6 
2002 37 16 7 10 38 5 96 103 9 19 15 7 
2003 34 20 5 10 42 4 89 107 10 19 18 7 
2004 36 21 6 14 45 4 90 100 10 67 18 9 
2005 33 19 5 15 49 5 84 110 13 133 16 9 
2006 29 13 4 13 51 3 80 110 15 97 15 10 
2007 29 12 6 13 45 5 83 101 12 88 16 10 
2008 24 13 6 9 12 3 67 102 10 64 13 5 
Total  288 149 50 105 371 38 809 962 98 552 140 71 
  Luxembourg Malta 
Nether- 
lands Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden UK  Total 
Number of bank             
Observations by year             
2000 86 5 6 19 6 7 8 21 6 17  601 
2001 74 5 8 14 6 5 5 14 17 17  552 
2002 66 5 7 15 7 7 5 15 16 17  522 
2003 64 5 6 14 6 6 6 11 15 23  521 
2004 61 7 10 22 7 6 6 12 16 35  602 
2005 57 4 8 24 8 14 14 32 16 36  704 
2006 63 3 5 20 10 8 12 39 17 32  649 
2007 56 6 4 19 10 9 11 22 15 32  604 
2008 36 3 5 16 6 8 8 16 15 31  472 
Total  563 43 59 163 66 70 75 182 133 240  5,227 
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Table 2 






Mean St.dev Median  Minimum  Maximum 
 
Inputs 
          
Personnel expenses 48.8 10.19 147.6 0.080 2,044.0 
Total Fixed Assets 34.0 5.4 119.3 0.010 3,687.0 
Deposits and Short-term Funding 4518.1 797.6 13910 0.200 172,920 
  
      
 
Outputs 
Total Loans      
Total Other Earning Assets 2735.6 405.98 8440.0 0.500 94,013 
Fee-based Income 2667.9 326.7 9250.1 0.050 116,379 
a 
Values in € million.      
 
Table 3 
Variables Employed in the cross sectional regressions:
a 
  
Symbol Definition         Mean St.dev. Min Max Median 
Dependent Variables                   
INEFF Productive Inefficiency measure using the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology 
(VRS) 0.22 0.15 
    
0.23  0.00 0.84 
NIM 
(Interest Income - Interest Expenses) / Interest-
Bearing Assets 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.49 0.02 
C/I Cost / Income Ratio 0.63 0.17 0.03 0.99 0.63 
           
Regulatory and Supervisory Variables               
CAPRQ Capital Regulatory Index 5.83 1.64 3.00 9.00 6.00 
SPOWER Official Supervisory Power 9.39 2.26 5.00 14.00 9.00 
ACTRS Activity Restrictions 7.23 2.61 3.00 12.00 7.00 
PRMONIT b Private Monitoring 7.91 0.97 5.00 9.00 8.00 
           
Bank-Specific Control Variables                 
LNTA Logarithm of Total Assets 7.03 1.67 2.90 12.30 6.87 
LIQ Total Loans / Total Deposits 0.73 1.77 0.00 80.06 0.67 
EQAS Shareholder's Equity / Total Assets 9.57 7.91 0.26 88.20 7.60 
           
Risk of Insolvency                   
Z-SCORE        Risk of Insolvency                                                               8.91 5.61 2.42 78.38 8.42 
                      
Country-Specific and Institutional Variables               
HERF Herfindahl index of local market concentration 0.21 0.14 0.04 0.90 0.19 
GDPGR Annual Growth rate of per capita GDP 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.12 0.02 
VOICE Voice and Accountability 1.26 0.20 0.71 1.78 1.32 
CORR  Control of Corruption  1.47 0.67 0.11 2.39 1.77 
GOVER Government-Owned Banks 10.73 15.33 0.00 42.20 3.90 
FINDEV Deposit Money Bank Assets / GDP 1.17 0.38 0.18 2.49 1.18 
FOREIGN Foreign-Owned Banks       0.30 0.33 0.00 0.99 0.16 
a All financial variables measured in € million. Annual GDP growth is measured at constant 2000 market prices.    
 b Data for the PRMONIT variable refer to the EU16 sub-sample. 
Sources: WB (Barth et al. 2001b; 2006; 2008), Governance Matters VIII (Kaufman et al., 2009), WB financial 
structure database (Beck et al., 2009), AMECO, Bankscope and own calculations.
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Table 4. The relationship between bank inefficiency and regulation (equation 1a) 
Years: 2000-2008   
Dep.Var.: INEFF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Regulation and Supervision                
CAPRQ  0.002 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.001 0.002 -0.006** -0.013*** 
SPOWER -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003** 0.001 0.003** 
ACTRS  0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.0004 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.004* 0.012*** 
PRMONIT  - - - - - - 0.011*** 0.012*** 
                  
Bank-Specific variables                 
LNTA -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.033*** 
LIQ -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.002 -0.001 
EQAS -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
                  
Risk of Insolvency                 
Z-SCORE - - - -0.0003 - -0.001** -0.002** -0.002*** 
                  
Country-Specific variables                 
HERF 0.194*** 0.217*** 0.216*** 0.191*** 0.149*** 0.182*** 0.215*** 0.203*** 
GDPGR 0.503*** 0.356*** 0.337*** 0.061 0.687*** 0.338*** 0.448*** 0.588*** 
VOICE - -0.053*** - - - - - - 
CORR - - -0.018*** - - - - - 
GOVERN - - - -0.001*** - - - - 
FINDEV - - - -0.032*** - - - - 
FOREIGN - - - - -0.037*** -  -  -  
Constant -0.580*** -0.501*** -0.534*** 0.047*** 0.388*** -0.557*** -0.718*** -0.717*** 
                  
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES NO YES NO 
Crisis Dummies NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES 
Observations 5227 5227 5227 5227 5227 5227 2548 2548 
Number of Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 16 16 
Note: CAPRQ= Capital Regulatory Index, SPOWER= Official Supervisory Power,  ACTRS= Activity Restrictions, PRMONIT= Private Monitoring, LNTA= LN of Total Assets, LIQ= Total Loans/Total Deposits, EQAS= equity/assets, Z-
SCORE= (ROA+EQAS)/St.Dev(ROA), HERF= Herfindahl Index, ΔGDP= Real GDP Growth, VOICE= Voice and Accountability, CORR= Control of Corruption, GOVERN= Government-Owned Banks, FINDEV= Deposit Money Bank 
Assets/GDP, FOREIGN=Foreign-owned banks, Crisis= Dummy variable that equals 1 after year 2006 and 0 otherwise, Constant= constant term.   
Estimation of the models is based on Simar and Wilson (2007), Algorithm 1, using 2000 bootstrap replications for the confidence intervals of the estimated coefficients. 
*p<0.1 Significance from zero at the 10% level according to bootstrap confidence intervals.       
**p<0.05 Significance from zero at the 5% level according to bootstrap confidence intervals.     
***p<0.01 Significance from zero at the 1% level according to bootstrap confidence intervals.     
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Table 5. The relationship between bank costs of intermediation and regulation (equation 1b)  
Years: 2000-2008   
Dep.Var.: NIM (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Regulation and Supervision                
CAPRQ  -0.001** -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0003 
SPOWER  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0004** -0.0003* -0.0002 0.001*** 0.001** 
ACTRS  0.002*** 0.001*** 0.0004** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
PRMONIT  - - - - - - 0.002*** 0.002*** 
                  
Bank-Specific variables                 
LNTA -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
LIQ 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.0001 -0.0002 
EQAS 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
                  
Risk of Insolvency                 
Z-SCORE - - - -0.0002*** - -0.0003*** -0.001*** -0.0004*** 
                  
Country-Specific variables                 
HERF 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
GDPGR 0.024 -0.018 -0.03 -0.073*** 0.036* -0.009 -0.004 -0.015 
VOICE - -0.017*** - - - - -   
CORR - - -0.007*** - - - -   
GOVERN - - - 0.0002 - - -   
FINDEV - - - -0.011*** - - -   
FOREIGN - -   - -0.002       
Constant 0.035*** 0.060*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.002 0.001 
                  
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES NO YES NO 
Crisis Dummies NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES 
Observations 5227 5227 5227 5227 5227 5227 2548 2548 
Number of Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 16 16 
Note: CAPRQ= Capital Regulatory Index, SPOWER= Official Supervisory Power,  ACTRS= Activity Restrictions, PRMONIT= Private Monitoring, LNTA= LN of Total Assets, LIQ= Total Loans/Total Deposits, EQAS= equity/assets, 
Z-SCORE= (ROA+EQAS)/St.Dev(ROA), HERF= Herfindahl Index, ΔGDP= Real GDP Growth, VOICE= Voice and Accountability, CORR= Control of Corruption, GOVERN= Government-Owned Banks, FINDEV= Deposit Money 
Bank Assets/GDP, FOREIGN= Foreign-owned banks, Crisis= Dummy variable that equals 1 after year 2006 and 0 otherwise, Constant= constant term.   
Estimated using Generalizes Linear Models (GLM). 
*p<0.1 Significance from zero at the 10% level              
**p<0.05 Significance from zero at the 5% level              




Table 6. The relationship between bank cost effectiveness and regulation (equation 1c) 
Years: 2000-2008   
Dep.Var.: C/I (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Regulation and Supervision                
CAPRQ  -0.006*** -0.004** -0.003* -0.002 -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.027*** -0.020*** 
SPOWER  -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.005*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 
ACTRS  0.004*** 0.0001 -0.002 0.0005 0.005*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.006*** 
PRMONIT  - - - - - - -0.001 -0.001 
                  
Bank-Specific variables                 
LNTA -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.035*** -0.037*** 
LIQ -0.0002 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.001 
EQAS -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
                  
Risk of Insolvency                 
Z-SCORE - - - -0.0002 - -0.0004 -0.002*** -0.001 
                  
Country-Specific variables                 
HERF -0.028 0.016 0.013 0.025 -0.072*** -0.018 -0.012 -0.009 
GDPGR -0.453*** -0.731*** -0.771*** -1.086*** -0.039 -0.623*** -0.575*** -0.833*** 
VOICE - -0.112*** - - - - - - 
CORR - - -0.038*** - - - - - 
GOVERN - - - 0.001*** - - - - 
FINDEV - - - -0.085*** - - - - 
FOREIGN - - - - -0.062***       
Constant 0.909*** 1.071*** 1.001*** 1.000*** 0.882*** 0.921*** 0.940*** 0.967*** 
                  
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES NO YES NO 
Crisis Dummies NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES 
Observations 5227 5227 5227 5227 5227 5227 2548 2548 
Number of Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 16 16 
Note: CAPRQ= Capital Regulatory Index, SPOWER= Official Supervisory Power,  ACTRS= Activity Restrictions, PRMONIT= Private Monitoring, LNTA= LN of Total Assets, LIQ= Total Loans/Total Deposits, EQAS= 
equity/assets, Z-SCORE= (ROA+EQAS)/St.Dev(ROA), HERF= Herfindahl Index, ΔGDP= Real GDP Growth, VOICE= Voice and Accountability, CORR= Control of Corruption, GOVERN= Government-Owned Banks, FINDEV= 
Deposit Money Bank Assets/GDP, FOREIGN=Foreign-owned banks, Crisis= Dummy variable that equals 1 after year 2006 and 0 otherwise, Constant= constant term.   
Estimated using Generalizes Linear Models (GLM). 
*p<0.1 Significance from zero at the 10% level              
**p<0.05 Significance from zero at the 5% level              
***p<0.01 Significance from zero at the 1% level              
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Table 7. Quasi-Likelihood estimation method  
 
              
Years: 2000-2008 (1) (7) (1) (7) (1) (7) 
Dep.Var.:  INEFF NIM C/I 
              
Regulation and Supervision            
CAPRQ 0.006 -0.040*** -0.021*** -0.046*** -0.025*** -0.117*** 
SPOWER  -0.018*** 0.002 -0.016** 0.032*** -0.027*** 0.045*** 
ACTRS  0.020*** 0.031*** 0.062*** 0.088*** 0.019*** 0.071*** 
PRMONIT  - 0.098*** - 0.064*** - -0.005 
              
Bank-Specific variables             
LNTA -0.227*** -0.211*** -0.114*** -0.094*** -0.093*** -0.149*** 
LIQ -0.018* -0.012 0.015** 0.0002 -0.001 0.001 
EQAS -0.044*** -0.044*** 0.014*** 0.026*** -0.012*** -0.026*** 
              
Risk of Insolvency             
Z-SCORE - -0.005 - -0.019*** - -0.010** 
              
Country-Specific variable             
HERF 0.970*** 1.383*** 0.812*** 1.014*** -0.121 0.049 
GDPGR 2.889*** 3.507*** 0.439 -0.085 -1.916*** -2.371*** 
              
Constant 0.062 -1.139*** -3.133*** -4.192*** 1.731*** 1.860*** 
              
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,227 2,548 5,227 2,548 5,227 2,548 
Number of Countries 22 16 22 16 22 16 
Note: CAPRQ= Capital Regulatory Index, SPOWER= Official Supervisory Power, ACTRS= Activity Restrictions, PRMONIT= Private Monitoring, LNTA= LN of Total Assets, LIQ= Total 
Loans/Total Deposits, EQAS= equity/assets, Z-SCORE= (ROA+EQAS)/St.Dev(ROA), HERF= Herfindahl Index, ΔGDP= Real GDP Growth, Constant= constant term.   
Estimated using Papke and Wooldridge (1996) Quasi-Likelihood estimation method.  
*p<0.1 Significance from zero at the 10% level.         
**p<0.05 Significance from zero at the 5% level.         
***p<0.01 Significance from zero at the 1% level.         
 
